The aim of this paper is to determine the significant variables in the fertility patterns of the Roma population in Spain. Family and home production are two of the idiosyncratic features of this minority group, and our theoretical and empirical analyses take account of both, as well as other variables that appear in the existing literature. Our main insights are that a greater bargaining power of parents, with respect to their adult children, and a greater involvement of adult children in the production of the family good, are major contributory factors in increasing the number of children.
Introduction
Countries with high and growing per capita income have, in recent years, experienced significant declines in fertility, to the extent that most of those countries are now below replacement-level fertility. This phenomenon has no precedent in recorded history (Feyrer et al., 2008) . The pattern shown by macroeconomic indicators tends to obscure the differences in fertility levels across minority ethnic populations in developed countries. Since the presence of minority ethnic groups is rather the rule than the exception (Berritella, 2012) , it is no surprise that there exists an extensive literature on why ethnic minority groups have different levels of fertility 1 . Education and income appear to be the main factors influencing fertility decisions; more educated and/or wealthier parents decide to have fewer children, due to the greater time-opportunity cost of child-rearing (De la Croix and Doepke, 2003) . Thus, if education and income explain fertility behavior, differences in fertility between minorities and majorities should disappear once these variables are controlled for (the assimilation hypothesis: Gordon, 1964 ). The minority group status hypothesis rejects assimilation theory, establishing that the minority characteristic exerts an independent effect on fertility due to the insecurities and marginality associated with minority group status (Goldscheider and Uhlenberg, 1969) .
In this paper, we analyze the fertility patterns of a particular minority ethnic group, the Roma population of Spain. Spanish laws covering the protection of data Family ties and home production are two idiosyncratic features of this minority ethnic group. The family is the core of the Spanish Roma social organization; family members usually live very close to each other, so that family ties are very strong; family beliefs and preferences matter much more than the market and institutions; and members of Spanish Roma families have a high level of involvement in family businesses. More than 11% of the Roma population in Spain is involved in a family business, compared to only 3% of the total Spanish population 5 .
In our analysis, family ties and home production (i.e. family business and housework) are considered to play an important role in determining the fertility patterns of the Spanish Roma population. Both factors are present in the study by Alesina and Giulano (2010) , who establish that strong family relationships are associated with larger families, and that strong family ties are linked to more time spent in home production (in the form of housework). In a more recent working paper published in 2013, the same authors claim that beliefs in the importance of the family may cause a specialization in family-based businesses, which in turn reinforces the attachment to the family. We consider both housework and family business to be what the economic literature refers to as the family good 6 .
We first build a family bargaining framework that allows us to analyze the intrafamily allocation of effort from parents and their young adult children to the production of a family good 7 (adult children living with their parents are rarely included as decision makers in theoretical models; Doss, 2013) . Specifically, we present a family model where a parent and their adult children play a two-stage game. In the first stage, the parent unilaterally decides the number of children, and in the second stage, the effort devoted to the family public good by each family member is deduced. That it is to say, while the number of children is an individual parent's decision, the amount of family public good is a bargaining decision, given that both decisions are interconnected.
Solving the game, the parent's bargaining power, together with the family members'
5 Source: own elaboration using the 2011 Spanish Roma Population Survey (SRPS) provided by FSG and the Spain Economically Active Population Survey (Statistical Spanish Office: http://www.ine.es/en/inebmenu/mnu_mercalab_en.htm) 6 In the family economics literature, the family good is also referred to as a household public good. 7 See McElroy and Horney, 1981; Manser and Brown, 1980 and Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, among others. productivity for the family good, emerge as factors influencing the parental decision on the optimal number of children.
The second step in our analysis is empirical. Using the 2011 Spanish Roma Population Survey (SRPS) elaborated by FSG, and introducing education, income, labor status, gender, age -and certain idiosyncratic cultural aspects of the Spanish Roma population as control variables -we find support for our theoretical thinking: those Spanish Roma families in which the head of the family presents a greater bargaining power are those with more children. Furthermore, the young adult children's degree of contribution to the family good, as an approach to their level of productivity in this family good, affects positively the number of children.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a descriptive analysis of the Roma population in Spain. Section 3 sets up the model and derives the basic theoretical findings. Our empirical study is presented in Section 4, and Section 5 outlines our conclusions.
The Roma population in Spain
The Spanish Roma population is formed by the groups who first arrived in Spain in the 15th Century. Table 1 shows a significant gap between the Spanish Roma population fertility patterns and those of the Spanish population at large. To clarify that, since the last fertility survey of the general Spanish population was done in 1999, it is not possible to make a perfect comparison. An alternative approach, using 2011 as reference year, is possible using data included in the study Spanish and migrant Roma population in Spain: employment and social inclusion -2011-a comparative study. Whereas the portion of individuals 14 years old and under was 26.3% in the Roma population, this portion was 14.75% in the general Spanish population. Moreover, the study also points to the fact that the birth rate of the Spanish Roma population is increasing.
Focusing on income, the Survey of Income and Labor Conditions (SILC)
indicates a total disposable monthly household income of close to €2,400 for the general
Spanish population, whereas SRPS shows that this average for the Roma population is around €522. More differences arise in terms of education (see Figure 1 ). Among the stereotypes of Spanish Roma population, the more common is that the Spanish Roma do not recognize the value of work. Laparra (2007) provides evidence against this assertion; in fact, the Spanish Roma enter the labor market at an earlier age and have higher activity rates than the general Spanish population. This author highlights the importance of collaboration in family economic activities. Table 2 presents the percentage of the population by occupation, for both groups. The question is whether education, income, and occupation are the only factors that determine the fertility patterns of this minority ethnic group. The following two sections will establish the theoretical and empirical framework to examine this question.
A theoretical framework
We build a simple model of intra-household bargaining over a public family good production. The level of the public family good produced will be the result of a bargaining process among parents and their young adult children. Additionally, parents also individually decide the desired number of children.
Let us consider a parent (father or mother) whose preferences are given by the following utility function 17 :
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where Q is the level of a family public good produced by the family members and consumed by the family, P C is the parent private good consumption level, and P t is the time devoted by the parent to the production of the family public good. This time implies a cost in utility terms, B(.) that takes the following functional form:
This utility cost encompasses individual tastes for work outside the home, and monetary opportunity costs of working for the family rather than for others. Note that the family public good is not a perfect substitute for market private goods. The utility function of a representative young adult child is given by:
with y t being the time devoted by each young adult child to the production of the family public good. The interrelationship between parents and young adult children is channeled primarily through the family good. The functional forms considered guarantee strictly quasi-concave and increasing utility functions of the parent and each young adult child.
We assume that the public good produced by the family members takes a Cobb-
with n being the number of young adult children in the household.
Focusing now on the budget restrictions of each family member, we denote the parent income as P M , devoted to the parent's own consumption and also to a monetary transfer to each young adult children, T. Transfers within families are common (Cox and Fafchamps, 2008) . To maintain the tractability of the problem, we assume that the young adult children do not work outside the family, in such a way that the transfer from the parent is devoted to private good consumption.
We solve a two-stage sequential game under perfect information. In the first stage, the parent individually decides the number of children, n, and in the second stage, the effort devoted to the family public good by each family member is the result of a bilateral bargaining process among the parent and the young adult children.
Applying backward induction, we begin to solve the second stage of the game.
Following Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Chen and Wolley (2001) , the noncooperative setting -in which the parent and each young adult child individually decide their contribution to the public good production (Cournot-Nash) -is used as a threat point for the cooperative Nash-bargaining problem.
Therefore, the parent problem is given by: 2 ( , , ) (1 ) ln( ) ln( )
and the problem of a representative young adult is given by:
This leads to the following first order optimal conditions for A t and Y t , respectively:
(1 ) 2 0,
in such a way that the contribution level of the parent to the family good in the noncooperative setting amounts to Notice that, at the threat point, the optimum contribution of each young adult child to the family good does not depend on the number of siblings. Introducing these levels into the utility functions, we obtain the optimum utility levels under a non-cooperative setting:
In a cooperative equilibrium, the contributions to the family good are Pareto efficient. Therefore, the utility possibilities frontier is characterized by the following conditioned optimization problem: 
The first order conditions are given by:
(1 )(1 ) 2 0, (1 ) 2
The difference in the non-cooperative solution is the effect of the number of siblings in the level of family good of parent and children.
Therefore, the utility possibilities frontier obtained is: ( , , ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) ln (1 ) ln( ) ln ln( ) 1 . 2 2
Moreover, the slope of the utility possibility curve is n dU
As we have previously mentioned, the allocation of welfare among the family members is the result of the Nash bargaining solution corresponding to the following maximization problem:
.
where β and (1−β) denote parent and young adult child bargaining power, respectively, and P U , Y U , denote the parent and young adult child levels of utility obtained at the threat point, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that parents treat all children equally and hence, no different bargaining powers among siblings emerge.
From the first order condition of this problem:
we are able to obtain the optimum levels of utility in the Nash bargaining setting:
(1 ) ln(1 ) ln( ) 2 2 (1 ) ln (1 ) (2 3 ) ln( ) (1 ) (1 ) , 2 Our theoretical framework is related to the explanation proposed by Salcedo et al. (2012) , who build a model where living with others is beneficial because the costs of household public goods can be shared. Since the income elasticity of household public
goods is lower than that of private goods, then public household goods become relatively less important as incomes rise, which would cause a decline in optimum household size. However, these authors model the household as a group of roommates abstracting from intra-household bargaining, and also identify public household goods with food consumed at home, housing, and household appliances, abstracting from family-based business. The next and last step is to check whether our theoretical findings are supported by empirical evidence. 
Empirical evidence
In our estimations, the dependent variable is the number of children. However, since certain factors affecting the likelihood of having children, and those affecting the number of children, are linked, we have estimated the model using Heckman's sample selection, in order to obtain unbiased estimations. Implementing the Heckman model requires the selection of variables that have an effect on the discrete choice of whether or not to have children, but not on the amount of children. We have considered the status 'married' as the selection variable.
In order to introduce the bargaining power of parents β as an independent variable, we choose two alternative proxies to measure it. The first is a variable that counts, apart from the head of the family (the reference person of the interview), those members who have a link of brother, sister, brother in-law, sister-in-law, mother, father, father in-law or mother in-law, with the head of the family. This number measures the magnitude of those who play the role of parent in our theoretical framework, and it seems plausible to us that, the higher the number of those who play the role of parent within the family unit, the greater the bargaining power of the "parents" dealing with young adult children. This variable has been normalized to values between 0 and 1 to fit the empirical estimation to the theoretical model. The second is the health of the head of the family. This variable has been built through the answer given by the head of the family about his/her health, the answers can be: very bad, bad, regular, well, and very well, and the given weights are 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.7, and 1, respectively. The hypothesis considered is that better perceived health of the head of the family will be associated with greater bargaining power of the parent. According to the theoretical model, the expected sign should be positive.
The second independent variable that emerges from our theoretical model is the productivity of the children for the family public good α. We build a proxy of the latter by counting those children over 16 who help with the housework and/or assist in the family business, and we normalize to values between 0 and 1. In the first estimation, we consider both tasks, housework and family business, to capture family good productivity, and in the second estimation, we separate them in order to check the robustness of the results. According to the theoretical model, the expected sign should be positive.
We introduce an extensive number of variables as control variables. Obviously, education, income, and occupation are present. Following Sanromá et al. (2009) , we have assigned 0 years of schooling to those with no formal studies; 3 years of schooling to those with incomplete primary education; 6 years for complete primary education; 8 years for incomplete high school; 10 years for complete secondary education; 14 years for a higher level training cycle; 15 years for incomplete tertiary education, 17 years for complete tertiary education, and 19 for a doctoral degree.
Additionally, we consider gender, the age of the head of the household, and whether the family resides in a rural or urban area. Cultural and social characteristics are also taken into account by way of religion variables and the degree of friendship with other ethnic groups. Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix A. Table 3 presents the Heckman selection model estimations for different proxies of the bargaining power, considering the family public good in its broadest sense, including the family business and housekeeping. Rho is negatively signed and different from 0, suggesting that the error term in the selection and primary equation is negatively correlated. Thus, unobserved factors that make having children more likely tend to be associated with a lower number of children.
Our results indicate that the bargaining power of parents plays an important role in determining the number of children in a family. The coefficient of the bargaining power variable is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the greater the parent bargaining power, the higher the number of children in the family. The estimation also shows a significant relationship between the child contributions to the family public good and the number of children in the family. Specifically, the coefficient of the parameter is positive and significant in both the determination of children and the selection model.
The age of the head of the family presents the expected sign; it is positively associated with the number of children. Paradoxically, education of the head of the family does not affect the number of children, probably because its effect is already captured by income and occupation. Income has a non-monotonic relationship, the higher the income, the lower the number of children, up to an income threshold that turns the relationship positive. Cultural differences also affect the number of children, while being Orthodox, Protestant or Evangelist decreases the number of children with respect to not reporting any religion.
The probability of having children is positively affected by the age of the head of the family and the child productivity for the family public good. However, the bargaining power of the father has a negative effect on the probability of having children. Other negative relationships on the likelihood of having children are individual income or being Orthodox. Being a student, employed, unemployed, or assisting with the family business, if beta is measured as health, decreases the probability of having children. Living in an urban area also decreases the likelihood of having children, but it has no effect on the number of children.
In Table 4 , the family good is proxied by family business assistance or, alternatively, by housework collaboration. Whereas the bargaining power variable β remains statistically significant in all estimations, not to consider the family good in the widest sense leads to the variable α losing significance. 
Conclusions
Two conclusions arise from this straightforward study. Family and home production are two idiosyncratic features of the Roma population of Spain, and it is confirmed that both affect the fertility behavior of this minority ethnic group, once we control for other factors present in the fertility patterns of other minority ethnic groups:
occupation, education, and income. The Spanish Roma family is characterized by authoritarian vertical relationships, and therefore the parent bargaining power has an influence on the number of children in the family unit that we have found to be positive.
Furthermore, the high degree of assistance from the adult children to the family business and to housework (e.g. care of siblings) increases the number of children in the family.
Our second conclusion is the need for more data, in order to advance our knowledge of minority ethnic groups. The debate between personal data protection and the advance of knowledge is an open question in society, especially when taking discrimination into account. The efforts of intercultural, social non-profit organizations devoted to obtaining adequate information to ascertain the realities of this ethnic group, and to implementing actions to improving Spanish Roma living conditions, and to preventing or eliminating all forms of discrimination should, at the very least, be given serious consideration.
